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THE INSANITY DEFENSE
HOW FAR HAVE WE STRAYED?
Jacques M. Quen M.D. I
George Santayana wrote: "Progress, far from consisting in change,
depends on retentiveness... and when experience is not retained... infancy
is perpetual."2 Santayana's enduring words underscore the wisdom of Cicero
who wrote: "To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to
remain always a child 3 It is with Santayana and Cicero in mind that this brief
critical analysis of the origins of the insanity defense, and its evolution to the
present, begins.
Cicero said: "Crimes are not to be measured by the issue of events but
from the bad intentions of men."4 There is evidence that the early Hebrews,
ancient Romans, early Church scholars, the Goths, and the Vandals, all
believed that conduct must be evaluated in the context of mental health and
maturity. Since modem American law has arisen primarily from early English
jurisprudence, however, this analysis of the evolution of the insanity defense
will begin with an overview of the seminal English cases.
In the thirteenth century, the English jurist Henry de Bracton wrote:
[W]e must consider with what mind . .. a thing is
done... in order that it may be determined accordingly what
action should follow and what punishment. For take away
the will and every act will be indifferent because your state
of mind gives meaning to your act, and a crime is not corn-
Jacques M. Quen, M.D. Clinical Professor of Psychology, New York Hospital, Cornell
Medical School; Asociate Director of the Section on the History of Psychology.
2 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, VOL. L 184 (Charles Scribner's Sons eds., 1905-
06)(2d ed. 1954).
3CICERO, ORATOR XXXIV. 120 (Loeb Literary Classics ed. & H.M. Hubbell trans. 1939)(3d
ed. 1962).
4 CICERO, PARADOX III, quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMuIiAR QUOTATIONs 34a (13th ed.
1955).
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mitted unless the intent to injure intervenes, nor is a theft
committed except with the intent to steal.
For de Bracton, a consideration of the individual's will was essential to the
judgment of his act. In the thirteenth century, William Lambard wrote: "If a
madman or a natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of his lunacy, or a child that
apparently hath no knowledge of good nor evil do kill a man, this is no
felonious act, nor anything forfeited by it... for they cannot be said to have
an understanding will." Historians of the insanity defense often evidence the
antiquity and primacy of the "knowledge of right and wrong test" by citing to
these passages. However, these historians fail to recognize that the last part
of Lambard's passage explains why it is important to evaluate the knowledge
of good and evil. It is because the presence or absence of that knowledge is an
indicator of the presence or absence of an "understanding will." But, it is not
necessarily the only indicator of the presence or absence of an understanding
will. Thus, like de Bracton, Lambard believed that consideration of both
intellect and volition must precede the judicial determination of a criminal act
or a criminal sanction.
Sir Matthew Hale, the renowned English judge of the seventeenth
century, furthered the evolution of legal thought on the subject of culpability
through his effort to define more clearly the concepts that are principal to the
debate. Hale believed that:
[m]an is naturally endowed with these two great faculties,
understanding and liberty of will, and therefore is a subject
properly capable of a law.... [T]he consent of the will is
that which renders human actions either commendable or
culpable; as where there is no law, there is no transgression,
so... where there is no will to commit an offense, there can
be no transgression, or just reason to incur the penalty or
5 HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS Er CONSUETUDINIBUs ANGLIAE, reprinted in, F.B. Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev 974, 985 (1932).
6 WILLIAM LAMBARD, 1 EIRENARCHA: OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF PEACE 218
(Newberry & Byneman 158 1)(cited in J. BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND 83-4 (Harcourt Brace
1955).
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sanction of that law instituted for the punishment of crimes
or offenses.
7
Hale found a distinct difference between partial insanity and total insanity:
partial insanity should excuse no crime but total insanity should so excuse.
In defining the concept of partial insanity, Hale wrote: "[T]he best measure
I can think of is this: such a person as laboring under melancholy distempers
hath yet ordinarily as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen
years hath 8.... I
Courts historically had used age categories to support significant
presumptions about an individual's ability to comprehend right and wrong.
In Hale's time, it was an unrebuttable presumption of law that an infant under
the age of seven could not commit a felony, and that a child of fourteen or
older was apriori capable of committing a felony. Children between the ages
of seven and fourteen were considered incapable of felonious behavior. If
they understood that they were doing wrong, however, they could be found
guilty of a criminal act. Thus, "malitia supplet aetatem" or "malice supplies
the [want of] age" was a popular maxim of the time. Hale's conclusion that
an insane adult with less understanding than an average fourteen-year-old,
was exculpable before the courts. His writing on the subject of insanity and
the law not only led to an enlightened application of the law in regard to the
disabilities of the insane, but also empowered juries with the responsibility of
determining whether individuals should be held accountabile for their actions
under the law. The modem standard for a determination of
insanity-complete, perfect, or absolute absence of all understanding (i.e.
mindlessness)-retains none of Hale's sensitivity.
After Hale, the concept of criminal insanity continued to develop in
English law until it reached its zenith in Regina v. Oxford.9 Justice Denman
charged: "[1]f some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within
him, which he could not resist," he would not be responsible. After Oxford,
the standard for criminal insanity moved away from the broad and merciful
7 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HisToRIA PLACITORUM CORONAE (The History of the Pleas of the
Crown) 14-15 (Robert H. Small ed., 1847).
8 Proceedings on the Trial ofJames Hadfield, at the Bar of the Court of the King's Bench,
for High Treason, June 26: 40 George li. A.D. 1800., in HOWELL's STATE TRIALS, VOL.
XXVII, at 1281 (Thomas Jones Howell, Esq. ed) (London, 1820).
9 Regina v. Oxford, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840)(Lord Denman).
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approach advocated by Hale and Denman and toward the narrow and punitive
standard utilized by courts today.
The first major blow to the approach of Hale and Denman came in 1843,
when Daniel M'Naghten was acquitted of murder after the examining
physicians declared him insane.'" The resulting public outrage came at a time
when England was in a period of economic and social instability.
Consequently, the House of Lords responded by demanding that the fifteen
judges of the Queen's Bench clarify England's criminal insanity law. Initially,
the judges were concerned that too narrow a definition would reduce the
judges' and juries' discretion and thereby prevent the orderly evolution of the
common law. The judges were also skeptical of the prospect of defining the
law in the realm of the hypothetical, without the benefit of facts stemming
from a specific case. Nonetheless, the judges of the Queen's Bench declared
that intellectual functions would be the sole criteria for determining insanity.
The courts could no longer consider affective and volitional factors.
The following year, Lemuel Shaw, the noted Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, presided over the murder trial of a convict
who had stabbed and killed his warden. That case, Commonwealth v.
Rogers," has gone down in American legal history as the first case in which
the M'Naghten rules were applied in America. In fact, Chief Justice Shaw did
not apply the rule of M'Naghten, but rather, he charged the jury in the specific
language of the Court in Oxford. He instructed that "if some controlling
disease was.., the acting power within [the accused],.., he would not be
responsible." In spite of this original application of the Oxford
principal,however, the M'Naghten rules soon became the general standard in
American courts.
Almost a quarter of a century later, in the case of Commonwealth v.
Haskell, Judge Brewster set forth the applicable standard, as he viewed it:
[[T]he true test [of insanity] lies in the word "power." Has
the defendant in a criminal case the power to distinguish
'
0 Daniel M'Naghten 's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
"G.T. BIGELOW & G. BEMIs, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF ABNER ROGERS, JR.,LATE WARDEN
OF THE MAssAcHusETrs STATE PRIsON; BEFORE THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MAsSAcHUsEI-rs, HOLDEN AT BOsTON, ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 30,1844. (Boston, Charles C.
Little and James Brown 1844).
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right from wrong, and the power to adhere to the right and to
avoid the wrong? In these cases has the defendant, in
addition to the capacities mentioned, the power to govern his
mind, his body, and his estate? 2
Once again, the historical development of the law returned to volition. The
ability to control one's mind and body became crucial in determining the
degree of criminal responsibility, because the law demands less of a will
disabled by mental disease.
New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Charles Doe meticulously
reviewed the English cases and precedents on insanity and their significance
in civil and criminal law. In 1868, he wrote a dissenting opinion in a case
involving a decedent's testamentary capacity. He concluded that "[a] product
of healthy, infantile immaturity, or of disease of the mind, is not a contract, a
will, or a crime." 3 Further, the judge concluded that the question of whether
a defendant has a mental disease was a ".. . question of fact for the jury, and
not a question of law for the court." 4 Four years later, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court applied Judge Doe's conclusion in State v. Pike.5 Two years
after Pike, this principle was reaffirmed on appeal in State v. Jones. 6
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia established
the Durham Rule, which commentators then characterized as "not unlike" the
rule estabished by the court in New Hampshire. Under the Durham Rule, "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect.' 7 The court would look only to "whether the
defendant's mental disease or defect caused the criminal behavior."'" Since
the Durham Court failed to provide an adequate explanation of the legal
12 Commonwealth v. Haskell, Ct. of Common Pleas (Philadelphia, 1868) (Hon. F. Carrol
Brewster, Judge).
"Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 147 (1865).
14 id
.
15State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 442 (1869).
'6 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
17 John Q. LaFond & Mary L. Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and
Civil Commitment Refo rms Made a D ifference?, 39 Viii. L. Rev. 71 (1994) (citing Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954)).
18 Id.
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principles, precedents, or rationale upon which its opinion was based, the rule
survived less than two decades.
The American Law Institute Model Penal Code (hereinafter MPG)' 9
succeeded the Durham Rule. The IvIPC restored explicit recognition of the
vulnerability of intellectual, affective, and volitional functions to differential
damage by mental disease. With only minor variations, the MPC was
generally accepted in the United States until the acquittal of John Hinckley Jr.
in 1982, after his attempted assassination of President Reagan. The Hinckley
verdict sparked mass media hysteria, which was exacerbated by the hysteria
of the leadership of the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Bar Association. Both organizations issued position statements calling for a
regressive and exclusionary law for criminal insanity. They demanded that
the law restrict findings of exculpatory insanity exclusively to mental illness
which affected the intellect and required a diagnosis of severe psychosis.
The goal of psychiatric and legal professionals had always been to
protect those disabled by mental illness. In contrast, the positions now
adopted by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar
Association sacrifice the rights of the most vulnerable members of the
mentally ill population. The question "How far have we strayed?" is one that
must be asked.
19 Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1962)(cited with approval in United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606, 622-25 (2d Cir. 1966)).
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